Independence and accountability in regulatory agencies: a stakeholder approach
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.32870/rc.vi4.96Keywords:
Regulatory agencies , independence, accountability, interest groupsAbstract
Since the 1990s, most national governments have been progressively incorporating new regulatory policies in different economic and social spheres, enshrining the renewed model of the «regulatory state». Regulatory agencies need high levels of independence and various accountability mechanisms to separate them from the spheres of political and private power. This article provides a theoretical-conceptual analysis that explains the importance of political independenceand accountability to civil society and other stakeholders, such as interest groups, in the various regulatory processes...
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